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The paper examines the claim that a virtuous cycle of more secure land rights,
more land-saving investments, and denser populations requires the development
of institutions that regulate competition over land. We construct a contest model
that links the tenure-security–investment relationship to the efforts of land users
to enhance land rights themselves and the role of institutional protection. We
study the effect of population growth on a close-to-subsistence economy, includ-
ing the possibility that it weakens institutional protection. We derive sufficient
conditions for a positive effect on land investment, but also show that population
growth can push the economy into a low-productivity trap.
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1 Introduction
Since the 1990s, rapid population growth and increasing agricultural commercial-
ization, including the current boom in biofuel development, have created mounting
competition for fertile land in many rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa.1 As a result,
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1 There is a large literature showing that the common image of a land-abundant agri-
culture no longer holds for most of Africa (see, e.g., Atwood, 1990; Migot-Adholla et al.,
1991; Platteau, 1996, 2000; Deininger, 2003; Deininger and Castagnini, 2006; Peters,
2004, 2007; Austin, 2008; Toulmin, 2008; Headey and Jayne, 2014). Although, on aver-
age, land is more abundant than in other continents, farm households seem to cluster in
areas with high population density and therefore have small plots that tend to shrink over
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indigenous land tenure systems that in earlier decades assured farmers’ land rights
have come increasingly under pressure. According to a widely held theory,2 these
pressures are not alarming, however, because they are just the forebode of a spon-
taneous process of individualization of land rights. It is claimed that customary
land-holding systems are flexible and adaptive enough to allow this endogenous
evolution; only in the final stage is a public intervention needed to consolidate and
legally enforce the rights that have freely emerged in the field. This process of
increasingly secure land rights for individual farmers is expected subsequently to
induce, through investments and land transfers, the higher productivity of land that
is required for a growing population.
More recently a number of authors have seriously questioned this optimistic
view for sub-Saharan Africa (see, e.g., Platteau, 1996, 2000; Deininger, 2003; Pe-
ters, 2004; Deininger and Castagnini, 2006; Bromley, 2008). A virtuous cycle of
increasingly precise land rights, more productivity-enhancing investments and land
exchange, and denser populations necessitates an appropriate pace and scale of in-
stitutional innovations. Africa has always been at a disadvantage in this respect
compared with Asia (Platteau, Hayami, and Dasgupta, 1998; Platteau, 2000). In
Asia, land-holding systems historically have been formed and adapted under con-
ditions of land scarcity, which largely explains why adjustments toward the adop-
tion of modern land-saving technologies have been relatively modest and without
much friction. In contrast, in sub-Saharan Africa as well as in other African coun-
tries with a recent history of relative land abundance, agricultural modernization
has been hampered by a major lag in evolving land institutions.3 This delay in pro-
viding adequate tenure security can lead to “a downward spiral of conflict and strife
over a rapidly shrinking overall pie” (Deininger and Castagnini, 2006, p. 322).
The literature (discussed in section 2) suggests two broad, interacting factors
that explain the lack of responsive land institutions in these African countries: the
traditionally egalitarian culture and the weak capacity of the state. In response to
growing land scarcity, the historical egalitarian culture in this region has a tendency
to distribute the communal land equally, but among fewer people. This has resulted
in many local land conflicts, hurting particularly groups of previous users with the
least status and power – typically women, migrants, and pastoralists. The struggles
time (Chamberlin, Jayne, and Headey, 2014; Headey and Jayne, 2014; Jayne, Chamber-
lin, and Headey, 2014).
2 This theory is related to the work of, e.g., Boserup (1965, 1981), Cohen (1980),
Noronha (1985), and Bruce (1988). It has been endorsed by the World Bank since a
report on Africa (The World Bank, 1989, p. 104) and by other major aid agencies, thereby
abandoning their earlier conventional view that customary land tenure in Africa impedes
agricultural development (Peters, 2004, p. 270). Platteau (1996, 2000) has provided a
detailed criticism of this theory, which he called “the evolutionary theory of land rights”
(see also Sjaastad and Bromley, 1997).
3 In highly populated parts of Asia, land intensification featured the increased use of
fertilizer, mechanization, and irrigation, whereas in Africa smallholder farmers mainly
responded to population pressures by more continuous cropping of existing fields, posing
problems of sustainability (see Headey and Jayne, 2014).
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over land, and the consequences for these groups, often have been aggravated by
the inadequacy of formal land institutions devised by the state. While most African
governments have started land reform processes, only a little land is yet formally
registered and titled. Moreover, these land titles are frequently not seen as legit-
imate and authoritative by either ordinary people or the elite. This has created a
situation where legally backed land claims are overlapping and competing with so-
cially legitimate land claims that are based on customary principles. Many agree
that the resulting confusion and insecurity have strongly increased the number and
duration of land conflicts and that, through political manipulation, some of these
conflicts have escalated in widespread violence.
The objective of this paper is to conceptualize and explore: (1) the interactions
between the efforts of competing social groups in trying to secure land rights, their
investments in land-saving technologies, and the involvement of traditional and
modern land institutions; and (2) how these interactions are affected by population
growth. A major finding is that population growth may cause a situation of low
tenure security, low land investment, and weak institutions from which it is difficult
to escape without access to external resources, because the revenue that can be
reaped through land taxation to fund a gradual enforcement of land institutions is
essentially limited.
We begin by constructing a simple contest game that examines the dissipation
of resources by two groups of land users who attempt to establish property rights
to land under conditions of land scarcity. Institutions act as a third party that can
reduce conflict and improve tenure security by deterring groups from taking of-
fensive steps. We determine to what extent land tenure security and group payoffs
depend on the degree of institutional protection. One conclusion from the basic
model is that institutions do not always matter (Propositions 1 and 2). For instance,
if the productivity of retained land is sufficiently higher than that of captured land,
groups avoid conflict by engaging in defensive activities to the extent that any insti-
tutional help is superfluous. However, if the relative productivity of retained land is
not that high, then private defensive measures are inadequate, and tenure security
is an increasing function of the amount of institutional protection per unit of land.
Next, the model is extended with land investments by letting groups also decide
on the level of land productivity. Our purpose is to examine how productivity-
enhancing and security-enhancing efforts by farmers respond to lower land tenure
security. The answer depends on whether lower tenure security stems from weaker
institutions or from more aggression by other land users – a distinction that seems
to be overlooked in the literature. Less institutional protection reduces land in-
vestment and raises defensive measures by farmers (as in Deininger and Jin, 2006;
Fenske, 2011). Thus institutional and self-organized protection are substitutes here.
More outward aggression also discourages land investment, but now any defensive
measures by farmers will also decrease. This is because the lower productivity
resulting from fewer land investments makes it less worthwhile for farmers to ar-
range more protection of their land or even maintain the same level. It implies
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that, in principle, more outward aggression has a stronger negative effect on land
investment than weaker institutional protection.
The extended model is subsequently used to investigate the effect of population
growth. We start by addressing the above debate on the adaptability of traditional
landholding systems to rising population pressure by deriving sufficient conditions
for population growth to exert a positive effect on land investment, qualifying also
the requirement of having institutional protection of land rights in place (Theo-
rem 1). Then we take the debate one step further by arguing that population growth
also tends to undermine institutional protection, whether customarily or legally ar-
ranged. We examine to what extent the ability of traditional and state-controlled
systems to project power over the land is constrained by the revenues collected
through taxes or other contributions that can be extracted from land users. The
two may even be interdependent, as the collected revenues for running a land gov-
ernance program are likely to increase with the degree of tenure security that is
accomplished through the program. We provide a tentative analysis of how the
budgetary room for improvements in institutional protection of land rights could
be affected by population growth. One finding is that, due to the interdependence,
population growth may push the economy into a state of low tenure security and
land investment where the possibility of funding gradual improvements in land
governance through land taxation is limited (Theorem 2).
The paper makes several contributions to the literature. One is a formal, inte-
grated analysis of some key relationships that are put forward in the large, mainly
qualitative and empirical literature on the importance of institutional protection
under increasing land scarcity (see references above). The paper also connects to
a more theoretical literature concerning the relationship between property rights,
economic development, and the power of the state (for a survey, see Besley and
Ghatak, 2010). For instance, Besley and Persson (2009, 2011) provide a political-
economy model where the government chooses the level of institutional enforce-
ment (as well as the tax rate), subject to certain upper bounds that can be loosened
in the future by investing in legal and fiscal capacity. Konrad and Skaperdas (2012),
McBride, Milante, and Skaperdas (2011), and Garfinkel, McBride, and Skaperdas
(2012) study contest games where the contending groups themselves can invest in
institutional enforcement as a collective good. Our focus on the budgetary room for
improvements in institutional protection treats fiscal and legal capacity as given, yet
emphasizes the interdependence between the difficulty of collecting taxes and the
inability to define and enforce land rights. Moreover, how effective a given protec-
tion of land rights is depends negatively on the size of the population. Hotte (2001)
studies a different aspect by assuming that the effectiveness of property rights de-
creases with distance from the government’s administrative centre.
The paper also contributes to research on poverty traps (for a survey, see Barrett,
Garg, and McBride, 2016), particularly where poverty becomes self-reinforcing
due to investment insecurity arising from appropriation. For instance, Gonzalez
(2006) studies a contest game where imperfect appropriation of returns may dis-
courage or prevent investment even when its cost is negligible. Our results suggest
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that this may not hold if efforts to strengthen self-protection do not rival with invest-
ment, allowing an increase of both. Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2003) briefly ex-
amine the endogenous relationship between appropriation and budget-constrained
law enforcement. They find that improving public protection may require such a
high tax that the profitability of productive activities, which have to carry the bur-
den of the tax, will fall below the profitability of predatory activities, thus tying
the economy to a low stage of development (see also Dabla-Norris and Freeman,
2004). Similarly, Lloyd-Ellis and Marceau (2003) show that, in the presence of
endogenous credit constraints that particularly hamper low-wealth borrowers, re-
ducing the expected payoff to predatory activities through a public policy of harsher
punishments may also backfire if the required tax hike is too high. The obstructing
mechanism we propose is that a higher tax to fund more institutional protection
raises tax revenue per hectare, but lowers the number of taxable hectares as it af-
fects tenure security due to increasing appropriation.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sketches the background
of the analysis by discussing the lack of responsive land institutions in many sub-
Saharan countries. Section 3 specifies the basic model, a two-stage contest game
where land tenure security depends on group effort and an exogenous level of in-
stitutional protection. Section 4 extends the model to a three-stage game in which
groups undertake investments to increase land productivity. It looks at the interac-
tion between productivity-enhancing and security-enhancing efforts and how this
is influenced by institutional protection and outward aggression. Section 5 employs
the extended model to discuss the ability of traditional and state-controlled tenure
systems to project power over the land under rising population pressure. Section 6
concludes. An appendix contains proofs.
2 Background
At least two broad, interacting factors can be identified that explain the slow adap-
tation of land institutions in sub-Saharan Africa and in other African countries
with a recent history of land abundance: the traditionally egalitarian culture and
the weak capacity of the state. As there is an extensive literature on this topic, we
only highlight some features that help to put our analysis into perspective.
Land-abundant areas are historically inhabited by egalitarian societies. Commu-
nal networks of reciprocal relationships function as a social security system that
enables households to recover from setbacks and also guarantee cooperation in the
production and maintenance of public goods. The drawbacks of egalitarian norms
show up when the underlying stationary conditions change, especially when these
changes alter the relative positions of people (Boehm, 1993; Narayan et al., 2000,
ch. 4; Platteau, 2000, chapters 3–5; Hoff and Sen, 2006). When population growth
turned land into a scarce resource in many regions in sub-Saharan Africa, a first
response by social groups was to restrict the access of outsiders to their local ter-
ritories. For example, herders who historically relied on secondary rights of use
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of water and grazing resources found their passage increasingly blocked with crop
fields and enclosures. Continued population pressure on the land also tended to
affect the cohesion of social groups themselves. Many experts agree that the nu-
merous signs of cultural insecurity and social conflict in sub-Saharan Africa in the
recent past are indeed closely connected to the rapid transformation of communal
lands (see, e.g., Platteau, 2000; Deininger, 2003; Peters, 2004, 2007; Deininger
and Castagnini, 2006; Toulmin, 2008; Jayne, Chamberlin, and Headey, 2014). The
privatization of communal lands and the entry into market relations and a money
economy undermines traditional social safety nets and causes an erosion of egali-
tarian norms and values (for a formal analysis, see Haagsma and v. Mouche, 2013).
It leads to stricter definitions of those who have legitimate land claims and those
who have not. Thus local land conflicts turned up everywhere, hurting particularly
those with the least social and political status. In Rwanda, just before the outbreak
of civil war in 1994, customary practices with respect to land transfers to family
and relatives increasingly refused categories of people that had traditionally re-
ceived social protection, such as return migrants, divorced women, and orphans.
The extreme land scarcity in this country, in combination with inequalities in off-
farm employment opportunities, created the tensed atmosphere that contributed to
the outbreak of the civil war (André and Platteau, 1998).4
The unequal impact of eroding traditional authority systems has often been ag-
gravated by the weak capacity of the state. Herbst (2000, chapters 1 and 4) mentions
two broad reasons why land-abundant areas typically provide a major obstacle to
state formation. First, low population densities make it costly for the state to exert
control over people, especially under the large variety of ecological and geograph-
ical conditions that characterize African countries (see also Austin, 2004). Second,
because an abundance of open land tends to discourage territorial wars, the ne-
cessity to organize an efficient tax administration to cover military expenditures is
essentially missing.5 Hence, the recent history of land abundance in sub-Saharan
Africa gives a clue to why governments in this region are badly equipped to ac-
commodate the rising pressures on the land and to provide tenure security. Not
only the ability but also the willingness of central authorities to invest in rural areas
has traditionally been lacking, also because African politicians tend to equate their
political survival with appeasement of the urban populations (Bates, 1981). As a
result, taxation of land or income has always been low, also in colonial times, and
today revenue collection still mainly depends on trade taxes and non-tax revenues
such as aid and earnings from natural resources (Austin, 2004; Di John, 2009;
OECD, 2010). The fiscal weakness has been aggravated by decades of economic
stagnation following the oil crises of the 1970s. It halted the gradual progress in
the control over the territories. Many basic agents of the state left the rural areas,
4 Additional pressure on the land comes from external forces, such as the recent de-
mand for biofuel, the establishment of wildlife conservation areas, and urbanization (Pe-
ters, 2004; Toulmin, 2008).
5 A large political-science literature highlights the contribution of war to state build-
ing; see, e.g., Herbst (2000, ch. 4) for an overview.
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including agricultural extension workers, tax collectors, and census takers (Herbst,
2000, ch. 1). While for some years now most African governments have started
land reform programmes, the bulk of land is still not formally registered.6 Since
demarcating and titling land (including legal machinery to enforce contracts) is
a prerequisite for assessing property taxes, it is suggested that states in the sub-
Saharan region, to some extent, are caught in a trap: increasing control over rural
land requires broadening of the tax base, and vice versa (see section 5.2).
The inadequacy of formal land institutions in much of Africa is demonstrated by
not only the low amount of registered land but also its weak social legitimacy (see,
e.g., Atwood, 1990, Sjaastad and Bromley, 1997; Platteau, 2000, ch. 4; Deininger,
2003; Toulmin, 2008; Deininger, Hilhorst, and Songwe, 2014). In some cases, land
rights are simply ineffective. For example, even when their land is legally backed
and formally registered, landholders who intend to sell or rent out land often have
to consult their family or community for approval. In other cases, land records
are unreliable. Because the records are not timely updated, the registration of land
increasingly falls behind the actual distribution of land ownership. All this has
produced a situation where traditional and modern authority systems, instead of
complementing each other, overlap and compete. It has brought confusion and in-
security regarding whose rights count and will be supported in case of a contest.
To secure their land claims, people spend resources to mark their property, such as
planting trees and digging irrigation furrows. In case of conflict, they act oppor-
tunistically by seeking a favourable judgement through a variety of channels (so-
called “institutional shopping”), such as community councils, customary chiefs,
local governments, and land agencies (Toulmin, 2008). Not surprisingly, the insti-
tutional uncertainty has strongly increased the number and duration of land con-
flicts, often at the expense of vulnerable categories of local populations (Platteau,
2000, ch. 4; Deininger and Castagnini, 2006). Moreover, it has prevented the high
levels of investment in land productivity needed to release the pressure on land and
feed a growing population (for an overview, see Place, 2009, and Fenske, 2011; see
also section 4).
The interplay of some of these factors is examined in the next sections. We study
the impact of population growth on land investment and tenure security for the
case where poorly protected land users establish land rights themselves through
appropriative activities. Population growth not only fuels conflicts over land but
is also considered to undermine institutional protection. We show that this may
induce a state of low tenure security, low land investment, and weak institutions
from which it is difficult to escape without access to external resources, because the
revenue that can be collected through land taxation to fund a gradual enforcement
of land institutions is essentially limited.
6 In many African countries, formal registration of land covers much less than 10% of
the area. For example, in the West African region only 2–3% is held by written title, and
in Burundi less than 1% (see, e.g., Deininger and Castagnini, 2006; Toulmin, 2008).
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3 A Simple Contest Model with Institutional Protection of Land Rights
3.1 Basic Model
Malthusian pressure of population on limited land typically assumes a production
technology in agriculture where land and labour are imperfect substitutes. Below,
production is modelled in the most extreme way possible, by assuming that land
and labour are combined in fixed proportions:
qi D min.˛iai ;ˇl i /;
where qi is agricultural output (food or income), ai is land area in hectares, l i is
labour time (or effort), and ˛i and ˇ are positive parameters indicating land and
labour productivity. A fixed-coefficient technology is rather realistic in the case
of smallholder farmers, once they have chosen which crop to grow. Superscript i
refers to an endogenous variable of a group of agents of size Ni ; subscripts indicate
group parameters. Normalizing an individual’s time to unity, Ni also indicates the
total amount of available time of group i (so l i  Ni ). Another simplifying assump-
tion is that we ignore within-group distribution and coordination issues and treat
groups as unitary actors.
It follows that if land (of uniform quality and location) is abundant, all the avail-
able time will be devoted to production, granting that the marginal valuation of the
output from an extra hour of labour exceeds the disutility from working. With Ai
denoting the available amount of land of group i , the assumption of abundant land
can then be formally stated as Ai  ˇNi=˛i . If there are two groups in this region,
the (notional) demand for land of each group can be satisfied if and only if the
total quantity of land (A) satisfies A  ˇN1=˛1 CˇN2=˛2. Thus, in this simple set-
ting, land may become a scarce resource and under pressure of competing claims
when population (N1 CN2) grows, total supply of land falls (e.g., through the es-
tablishment of conservation areas), or labour productivities increase (e.g., through
mechanization). The restriction on land becomes less binding, however, when land
productivities increase (e.g., through the application of fertilizers, more effective
cultivation techniques, and other Green Revolution practices).
From now on, we consider an initial phase where land has become the scarce
factor (A < ˇN1=˛1 CˇN2=˛2). In section 1 it was argued that, as competition over
land emerges, only a timely development of institutional innovations that establish
and enforce precise land rights can prevent an escalation into violent and costly
conflict. We construct a simple contest game that is concerned with discovering
the relation between the dissipation of resources by groups in trying to establish
property rights to land, the involvement of (formal or informal) institutions, and
the degree of land tenure security. Although the analysis is in terms of groups
and proceeds at a certain aggregate level, sometimes we can also think of local,
small-scale settings where, for example, two households dispute the boundary of
their neighbouring plots of land. Also, a group may have no land at all, so the
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analysis can also address the case of returning migrants who find their previous
land occupied.
Therefore, suppose two groups 1 and 2 that are initially endowed with A1 and A2
hectares of land. The reallocation of land between the groups depends on how
much time each group devotes to appropriative activities, distinguished between
protecting its own land and threatening the land of the other, and the extent to which
institutions enforce the initial claims to land. The fraction of the initial endowment
of land (Ai ) that is retained by group i is denoted by pi and given by
(1) pi WD d
i Csi
d i Csi Cf j
(i ¤ j ). We see pi as a measure of the security of the land rights of group i . It
depends positively on the sum of defensive activities of the group (d i ) and the
institutional protection of its land rights (si ), and negatively on offensive activities
(fighting) of the other group (f j ). Self-organized and institutional protection are
simply considered as perfect substitutes, because we are less interested in to what
extent one can be replaced by the other. The underlying assumption here is that
authorities agree with the initial claims to land. Further observe that 1pj is the
fraction of the land of the other group (Aj ) that is taken away by group i .
The distinction between defensive and offensive activities in (1) was introduced
by Grossman and Kim (1995). It allows the study of a nonaggressive equilibrium
with positive defence levels, or an armed peace – a realistic possibility that earlier
work on contests cannot address (see, e.g., Tullock, 1980; Skaperdas, 1992; Hir-
shleifer, 1991, 1995). Examples of defensive activities in our context are building
fences and keeping watch over the land and also efforts with the primary purpose
of signalling claims to land such as planting trees and cultivating the land instead
of including a fallow period (see section 4). Examples of offensive activities range
from mild protests at a community meeting or local land agency to brutally chasing
people from their land. Sometimes the distinction is not so easily drawn, however,
as in the case where attack is considered to be the best form of defence.
The institutional parameter (si ) reflects the degree of compliance enforcement
exerted by the state (at various levels) or the community (or network of communi-
ties) to protect land rights. In the case of the state, si refers to the efforts of the legal
machinery to enforce land contracts and to settle disputes with the help of police,
courts, educated judges, and so on. In indigenous tenure systems such third-party
enforcement is typically missing. In this case, si refers to the efforts of community
members themselves to regulate land access through consensus and negotiation,
occasionally mediated by local rulers or a council of elders. It may be that the land
claims of the two groups are differently supported by the prevailing institutional
system. Examples of si ¤ sj are suggested by the tendency of indigenous tenure
systems to restrict land access along ethnic or gender lines and the inclination of
some formal, state-controlled tenure systems to promote land access for groups
with close ties to the government. We assume that the level of institutional pro-
tection cannot fall to zero, acknowledging that there is always some minimum of
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social cooperation through norm compliance in informal systems. Also, if state-
governed tenure systems break down, protection will probably fall back to this
informal default mode. Section 5 investigates the feasibility of institutional protec-
tion and how this may be affected by population growth.
The analysis allows for the possibility that a reallocation of land entails a loss
of agricultural production (also here following Grossman and Kim, 1995). Land
conflicts in Africa frequently result in a reduction of the total output and income of
farmers and herdsmen (examples are the destruction of crops, killing of cattle, or
damaging of fields (Deininger, 2003; Ofuoku and Isife, 2009). This implies that,
at least for a certain period of time, the gain of one group may be less than what
the other loses. Therefore, denoting the productivity of retained land by ˛ and
normalizing the productivity of captured land to one, it is assumed that the latter
is lower: ˛i  1. So group i loses the capacity for ˛i products for every hectare it
has to give up, while group j can grow only 1 product for every hectare gained.
Section 4 allows groups to decide on the level of land productivity, in this way
endogenizing the size of the output losses due to predation.
Given land scarcity and the fixed-coefficient technology, the agricultural output
of group i follows as
(2) qi D ˛ipiAi C .1pj /Aj
(i ¤ j ). The objective of the group is to maximize this output, taking into ac-
count the disutilities or costs related to working and appropriative activities. That
is, group i maximizes utility
(3) ui D qi i l i ıid i "if i ;
where i , ıi , and "i are positive parameters. Note that the efficient number of work-
ing hours is given by l i D qi=ˇ. To make working worthwhile, it is assumed that
ˇ > i (the marginal utility of the output from an extra hour of labour always ex-
ceeds the marginal disutility from working, i ). The parameters ıi and "i refer to
the disutilities or material costs of defending and fighting. A simple interpretation
of these cost parameters is the time spent on costly litigation in connection with
land disputes, but, as the earlier examples indicated, defensive and offensive activ-
ities typically go much further than this. In maximizing its utility, each group faces
a simple trade-off between reducing these disutilities or costs and maintaining and
expanding its land, and thus agricultural output. Notably, since we want to address
situations where land rather than labour has become the scarce factor, it is natural
to assume that appropriative activities do not restrict the time available for working
on the land. This implies that defending and fighting have no opportunity cost in
terms of forgone production.
We are now able to formulate a contest game for the two groups, throughout de-
noted by i;j 2 ¹1;2º with i ¤ j . Following Grossman and Kim (1995), we envisage
a two-stage game with complete information in which the groups, independently
and simultaneously, make their choices in two periods. In the first period, groups
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choose their time spent on defence, d i . In the second period, each group having ob-
served the defence of the other, chooses its time spent on fighting, f i . Using (1)–(3)
and l i D qi=ˇ, each group has payoff
vi ..d i ;f i /I.d j ;f j // WD

1 i
ˇ

˛i
d i Csi
d i Csi Cf j Ai C
f i
d j Csj Cf i Aj

ıid i "if i ;
(4)
where ˛i  1, ˇ > i > 0, ıi ;"i > 0, si ;sj > 0, and Ai ;Aj  0 (but Ai CAj D A > 0).
With Ni the total amount of time for group i , we assume defence d i 2 Œ0;Ni  and
fighting f i 2 Œ0;Ni d i .
Solving this game through backward induction yields the set of subgame-perfect
Nash equilibria.7 Our focus is on equilibria ..d 1

;f 1

/;.d 2

;f 2

// where time budgets
Œ0;Ni  and Œ0;Ni d i  are not binding – below we make some additional assump-
tions for this. Further, if qi

is the implied equilibrium production and so l i

D qi

=ˇ
is the equilibrium amount of labour, the basic assumption of land as scarce pro-
duction factor is simply satisfied by assuming Ni so large that l i Cd i Cf i  Ni
(i D 1;2).8
Observe that the game differs conceptually from Grossman and Kim (1995) in
incorporating the role of institutional protection. Moreover, in section 4 we endo-
genize the choice of land productivity (˛i ) through a third stage. In the subsequent
analysis we focus on the question: how do a group’s tenure security and payoff
depend on institutional protection?
3.2 Analysis
Let i WD 1i=ˇ refer to the marginal utility of output corrected for the disutility
of the required labour input. Two further parameters will play a key role and also
reduce notational clutter:
(5) rfj WD
j
"j
and rdi WD
i˛i
ıi
:
They indicate respectively the benefit–cost ratio of fighting for a hectare – the ag-
gressor’s marginal valuation of captured land relative to his marginal cost of fight-
ing – and the benefit–cost ratio of defending a hectare – the defender’s marginal
valuation of retained land relative to his marginal cost of defending.9
7 In general, applying the notion of subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is somewhat
problematic in two-stage games with simultaneous moves (see, e.g., Corchón, 1996). In
the current game this is not the case, however, because for each .d1;d2/ a game in strate-
gic form results where players have a strictly dominant strategy.
8 For example, in the case of an equilibrium with d i

D 0 D f i

(i D 1;2), it holds that
pi D 1, and so qi

D ˛iAi and l i D ˛iAi=ˇ. Then Ni must be so large that ˛iAi=ˇ  Ni(i D 1;2) (these restrictions imply A < ˇN1=˛1CˇN2=˛2, but not the other way around).
9 Note that the two parameters ignore the positive effects of defending on pi and
fighting on 1pj .
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To make sure that the time budgets for defence and fighting are not binding, we
make two additional assumptions. Let
(6) Odi WD rfj Ai si ;
and define a function yj W Œ0;Ni  ! R by
(7) yj .d i / WD
p
d i Csi
q
Odi Csi 
p
d i Csi

:
We assume
(8) Odi < Ni and yj < Nj  Odj :
As will be seen in a moment, positive levels of private defence and fighting will
never exceed Odi and yj , respectively.
We begin by determining the second-stage choice of the time allocated to fight-
ing. Group j takes defensive effort d i and dj as given and maximizes payoff vj
in (4) with respect to f j . Now observe that a group’s tenure security is inde-
pendent of that of the other group: pi and pj have no determinants in common.
Also, each payoff function is additively separable in pi and pj . This implies that
group j ’s optimal fighting effort does not depend on group i ’s fighting effort (it has
a strictly dominant strategy) and only responds to group i ’s defensive effort. The
best-response function is given by10
(9) f j D f j .d i/ WD
´
yj .d i / > 0 if d i < Odi ;
0 if d i  Odi :
It shows that group j is deterred from allocating time to fighting (a corner solution)
if group i ’s defensive effort exceeds a certain minimum level of private protection,
indicated by Odi . If this minimum required level for nonviolence is positive and
actual protection falls short of it (0  d i < Odi ), group j engages in fighting (an
interior solution). Note that the minimum required level Odi is nonpositive if and
only if the institutional protection per hectare received by group i exceeds group j ’s
benefit–cost ratio of fighting: si =Ai  rfj .
The first-stage choice of the time allocated to defence takes account of the Nash
equilibrium response of fighting to private defence. Group i chooses di to maximize
payoff vi in (4) incorporating the effect d i has on f j , as implied by f j .d i / in (9).
As before, group i ’s optimal defensive effort does not depend on group j ’s defence
(it has a strictly dominant strategy). We find
(10) d i D
8ˆˆ
ˆˆˆˆ
<ˆ
ˆˆˆˆ
ˆˆˆ:
0 if

.rdi =2/
2
r
f
j

Ai si  0 or Odi  0;
.rdi =2/
2
r
f
j

Ai si < Odi if 0 <

.rdi =2/
2
r
f
j

Ai si < Odi ;
Odi if 0 < Odi 

.rdi =2/
2
r
f
j

Ai si :
10 The results (9) and (10) are derived in the proof of Proposition A1 in the appendix.
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Hence, if the minimum required protection Odi  0, no defensive effort is under-
taken. Institutional protection is high enough to prevent any violence by the other
group – no additional defence is needed. Now suppose institutional protection is
deficient, so that the minimum required protection Odi > 0. According to the first and
second lines of (10), the preferred defence level falls short of this minimum require-
ment if the group’s benefit–cost ratio of defending (rdi ) is sufficiently low, viz., less
than twice the other group’s benefit–cost ratio of fighting (rfj ). In this case, land is
lost to the other group through fighting. According to the third line of (10), the pre-
ferred defence level is sufficient to deter any aggression if the group’s benefit–cost
ratio of defending (rdi ) is sufficiently high.
Combining the results (9) and (10), we immediately find the unique solution of
the game, denoted as ..d 1

;f 1

/;.d 2

;f 2

// (see Proposition A1 in the appendix). It
also allows us to summarize the conditions under which a group will refrain from
fighting and claiming land of the other group:
Proposition 1 Aggression by group j is absent, i.e., f j D 0, if and only if
(a) Ai D 0; or
(b) Ai > 0 and 2rfj  rdi ; or
(c) Ai > 0 and 2rfj > rdi and si=Ai  rfj .
The first case is obvious. The second case implies that there is no violence if
two times the aggressor’s benefit–cost ratio of fighting for a hectare is lower than
or equal to the defender’s benefit–cost ratio of defending a hectare. The threshold
against violence becomes higher if the aggressor’s cost of fighting ("j ) increases or
the defender’s cost of protecting land (ıi ) decreases (see (5)). Importantly, institu-
tional involvement is superfluous here: the private costs of defending and fighting
already allow for protective activities that discourage any level of confrontation.
Observe that if preferences and appropriation costs were the same (i D j and
ıi D "j ), a high enough relative productivity of land (˛i ) would motivate ade-
quate private defence. The third case requires a relatively high benefit–cost ratio
of fighting, where the groups themselves cannot avoid confrontation. Only insti-
tutional protection can bring about a nonaggressive equilibrium here (a tuple with
f 1

D f 2

D 0). Specifically, conflict is prevented if, for both groups, the received
protection per hectare (si=Ai ) is not less than the aggressor’s benefit–cost ratio of
fighting for a hectare.
Proposition 1 has some straightforward implications for the relative positions of
groups. For instance, group i can do without institutional protection if it is strong
in defending its land (ıi is low) or if group j has difficulties in forming an op-
posing force or feels itself morally forbidden to do so ("j is high). If group j is
also vulnerable to opposition (ıj is high), its claim on land can be easily denied by
group i , unless it is sufficiently shielded by institutional protection (sj =Aj is high
enough). We can see here an illustration of the weak position of specific social
groups in Africa. For instance, pastoralists and women are especially liable to suf-
fer exclusion from the land and appear to be most in need of institutional protection
to secure access to land (see section 2).
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It is now a small step to derive the relationship between tenure security and insti-
tutional protection. The degree of tenure security is found by calculating the frac-
tion of the initial land that is retained by a group in an equilibrium, pi

(using (1)).
High tenure security is crucial for the willingness to invest in land productivity (˛i ),
which would reduce the scarcity of land and take the sting out of land conflicts – a
topic we turn to in the next section.
Proposition 2 Suppose Ai > 0.
(a) If 2rfj  rdi , then pi D 1.
(b) If 2rfj > rdi , then
pi

D
8ˆ
ˆˆˆˆ
<ˆ
ˆˆˆˆ
ˆˆ:
rdi
2r
f
j
if si
Ai
 .r
d
i =2/
2
r
f
j
;
r
si
Ai
ı
r
f
j if .r
d
i =2/
2
r
f
j
 si
Ai
 rfj ;
1 if si
Ai
 rfj :
Figure 1 sketches how land tenure security of group i depends on institutional
protection per hectare (si=Ai ) for the case where groups themselves cannot prevent
conflict (Proposition 2(b)). It is seen that a certain minimum of protection is re-
quired for institutions to become effective in increasing tenure security. Full tenure
security arises when institutional protection per hectare exceeds the other group’s
benefit–cost ratio of fighting for a hectare (rfj ). The dashed curve illustrates that,
at given protection levels, tenure security of group i generally falls when the other
group’s benefit–cost ratio of fighting (rfj ) increases.
In equilibrium, the payoff of each group (vi

) is increasing in the institutional
protection of its own land (si ) and, because capturing land becomes more difficult,
decreasing in that of the other group’s land (sj ). Hence, it is not immediately clear
how a uniform level of institutional protection per hectare covering both groups
would influence individual payoffs and the total payoff per hectare. Providing such
a uniform level comes closest to a policy of equal land rights for all, particularly
supporting (potential) land users with little status and power. For our analysis in
section 5 it is sufficient to study here the simple case where there are no group
differences in preferences, appropriation costs, or land productivities, and also ap-
propriation costs are the same. So the assumptions are: 1 D 2 DW  (so 1 D 2),
ı1 D ı2 DW ı, "1 D "2 DW ", ˛1 D ˛2 DW ˛, and ı D ".11
Therefore, suppose s1=A1 D s2=A2 (from now on, A1;A2 > 0). Then both groups
enjoy the same land tenure security, and we can write p1

D p2

DW p

. With a little
manipulation (using (4)), the total equilibrium payoff per hectare can be expressed
11 Note that these assumptions do not imply that in equilibrium fighting efforts and
defensive efforts are the same, because fighting effort also depends on the size of the other
group’s land, and defensive effort on the size of own land (see the proof of Proposition A2
in the appendix).
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Figure 1
Land Tenure Security as a Function of Institutional Protection per Hectare
(case: 2rfj > rdi ; the dashed curve arises if rfj increases)
p
r
*
d
i
i
2r fj
si
Ai
(r di
r fj
/2) r fj
1
2
in three terms:
(11) v
1

Cv2

A
D ˛.˛1/.1p

/ ı.d
1

Cd2

/C".f 1

Cf 2

/
A
:
The first term of the right-hand side refers to the utility of the output per hectare
(corrected for the disutility to produce it) that would be attained if institutions pre-
vented any appropriative activity. The second and third terms indicate the potential
costs of appropriation. The second term refers to the destructiveness of reallocating
land through fighting, which obtains if agricultural production on captured land is
lost (˛1 > 0). We have already found that if the benefit–cost ratio of fighting (rfj )
is sufficiently low, groups themselves can take sufficient defensive measures to se-
cure their land, but otherwise only institutional protection can avoid reallocation
losses. The third term refers to the costs per hectare of the resources used for ap-
propriation. These costs are decreasing in institutional protection per hectare (see
Proposition A2 in the appendix). In sum, a higher level of institutional protec-
tion per hectare unambiguously raises the total payoff (and individual payoffs) per
hectare, and it does so by reducing or eliminating reallocation losses and cutting
private appropriation costs.
While the above illustrates the benefits of institutional protection, it does not
deal with the costs of providing this protection, nor how these could be funded.
Section 5.2 takes up this issue by exploring the feasibility of institutional protection
in traditional and state-controlled systems in relation to the pressure from popula-
tion growth. To set the stage, we first endogenize a key variable of the model: land
productivity ˛i . Note that by doing so the size of the reallocation losses will also
be endogenized.
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4 An Extension with Investments in Land Productivity
Secure land rights have long been considered as crucial to bring about the high
levels of investment in land productivity required to feed a growing population.
When farmers feel more secure in their right to make long-term use of their land,
the expected benefits to be reaped from structural land improvements are higher,
and thus the farmers are more willing to invest.12 Empirical research on African
tenure systems is, however, far from conclusive. There is indeed evidence suggest-
ing that the causality may run the other way around: investment may be undertaken
to increase security rather than in response to more security.13 Although sometimes
difficult to disentangle in practice, it is critical to distinguish between productivity-
enhancing and security-enhancing investments. For example, Deininger and Jin
(2006) reported that in Ethiopia farmers may plant eucalyptus trees with the goal
of signalling to others a claim to owning the land, while their less visible build-
ing of terraces for growing crops is principally undertaken to improve productivity.
They found that insecure tenure encourages tree planting but discourages terracing.
In this section we extend the model to a three-stage game in which groups decide
on the level of land productivity. While the main purpose of the extended model
is to explore the effect of population growth (section 5), the derived Nash equilib-
rium provides some direct implications for the interaction between productivity-
enhancing and security-enhancing activities and how this is influenced by institu-
tional protection and outward aggression.14
4.1 Extended Model
Suppose that, before choosing their time spent on defence (d i) and fighting (f i ),
groups are able to determine the level of land productivity of their initial land
(˛i ). Raising land productivity above the baseline level 1 is, however, increasingly
12 Two more effects of secure land rights are mentioned in the literature: they enable
land to be used as collateral for loans, and increase the transferability of land so that
it may reach more productive farmers. These effects are less relevant for sub-Saharan
Africa, where credit and land markets are thin (e.g., Jacoby and Minten, 2007; Fenske,
2011).
13 There is a large, mainly empirical literature on the relationship between tenure se-
curity and agricultural investment in Africa, including Atwood (1990), Besley (1995),
Sjaastad and Bromley (1997), Brasselle, Gaspart, and Platteau (2002), Jacoby and Minten
(2007), Deininger and Jin (2006), Bromley (2008), Lunduka (2011), and Melesse and
Bulte (2015). Extensive overviews are given by Place (2009) and Fenske (2011).
14 Only a few attempts have been made to model the relation between tenure security
and the two types of activities. Deininger and Jin (2006) and Fenske (2011) provided
similar theoretical frameworks where investment is a single decision variable that can
jointly produce higher productivity and more security. Their tenure security function is
however a black box, and in particular cannot distinguish between insecurity arising from
less institutional protection and from more outward aggression. Below it is shown that
these two sources of insecurity may have opposite effects on security-enhancing activities.
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costly. Investment costs are represented by a function Ci W Œ1;1Œ ! R given by
(12) Ci.˛i / WD ciAi
2
.˛i 1/2 with i
ci
<
2r
f
j
Ordi
;
where Ordi WD i=ıi is the benefit–cost ratio of defending a hectare in the baseline.
The specific form is just to ease the exposition – in particular, the assumption that
marginal costs are linear in the amount of initial land (Ai ). The restriction on ci
ensures that the three-stage game has a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
with finite land investment; the ratio i=ci is the benefit–cost ratio of investment per
hectare. The payoff function of group i is as before, except for the subtraction of
Ci.˛
i / (a complete definition of this game is after Proposition A2 in the appendix).
4.2 Analysis
The game can be solved through backward induction; thus we can employ the
previous results of the basic model and see what in the end determines the optimal
choices of ˛1 and ˛2.
Therefore, note first that equilibrium defence in the basic model (d i

) depends
on the group’s land productivity, because the benefit–cost ratio of defending (rdi )
depends on productivity.15 A higher land productivity may trigger higher expen-
diture on defence, because output losses loom larger in case of conflict. Let this
positive dependence be denoted by d i .˛i /. Verify that equilibrium fighting (f i

) is
not influenced by productivity (once the other group’s defence is fixed). Further,
it is convenient to make the dependence of equilibrium tenure security (pi

) on
the group’s land productivity explicit by writing pi.˛i Isi=Ai /, in accordance with
Proposition 2. Also, pi depends positively on productivity ˛i , since tenure security
is strictly increasing in private defence and d i is increasing, while the other group’s
fighting effort (f j

) is independent of ˛i (this can also be inferred from Figure 1).
The choice of land productivity by group i – in the “new” first stage – then comes
down to choosing an ˛i  1 that maximizes a function wi W Œ1;1Œ ! R given by
(13) wi.˛i / WD i˛ipi

˛i I si
Ai

Ai ıid i .˛i /Ci.˛i /
(see the proof of Proposition A3 in the appendix). It is immediately seen that each
group has a dominant strategy. Further observe that not only does the marginal
return to land investment depend on tenure security, but tenure security itself also
responds to investment. Relatedly, the marginal cost of land investment not only
consists of direct costs, but also of expenditure on defence, as noted above. The
first-order condition implies the following solution for productivity:
(14) ˛i

D 1Cpi

i
ci
;
15 For this paragraph the reader may also wish to consult Proposition A1 in the
appendix. There we also provide formal definitions of the below-mentioned functions
d i .˛i / and pi .˛i Isi =Ai / (see (A11) and (A12) with t D 0).
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where pi

is the equilibrium tenure security at a given level of institutional protec-
tion:
if
2r
f
j
Ordi
 i
ci
 1; then pi

D 1;(15a)
if
2r
f
j
Ordi
 i
ci
> 1;(15b)
then pi

D
8ˆ
ˆˆˆˆ
ˆˆ<
ˆˆˆˆ
ˆˆˆ:

2r
f
j
Ordi
 i
ci

1
if si
Ai
 rfj

2r
f
j
Ordi
 i
ci

2
;
r
si
Ai
=r
f
j if rfj

2r
f
j
Ordi
 i
ci

2
 si
Ai
 rfj ;
1 if si
Ai
 rfj :
(The complete solution of the three-stage game is given by Proposition A3 in
the appendix (with t D 0), including a proof with the derivations of (14), (15a),
and (15b).)
Hence, according to (14), the increase in land productivity relative to the baseline
equals the expected benefit–cost ratio of investment per hectare, pi

i=ci . (15a)
and (15b) imply that there are two cases to consider: whether 2rfj = Ordi i=ci is
equal to or less than 1, or is greater than 1. The first case requires a relatively low
benefit–cost ratio of fighting or a relatively high benefit–cost ratio of investing.
The group will then undertake the highest land investment (˛i

D 1Ci=ci) and
(as can be shown) arrange sufficient protection to deter any aggression (d i

D Odi ).
Just as before, institutional protection is superfluous here for achieving full tenure
security. Stronger institutional protection just lowers private protection per hectare
by the same amount. When the opposing group becomes more aggressive and tends
to threaten tenure security (rfj rises, and so does Odi ), the group simply neutralizes
the danger by raising its defence.
Figure 2 illustrates the other, more interesting case of a high benefit–cost ratio
of fighting or a low benefit–cost ratio of investing, where institutional protection is
crucial for promoting investment. The three sections of the solid productivity curve
correspond to low, increasing, and full tenure security. Starting from a state of full
security, weaker institutional protection per hectare (a fall of si=Ai) will eventually
lower tenure security and discourage land investment. Only when institutional pro-
tection arrives at the lowest section (the first branch of (15b)) does land investment
cease to fall. The reason is that lower protection is now compensated by higher
private defence, keeping tenure security constant. Thus institutional and private
protection are substitutes here (as in Deininger and Jin, 2006; and Fenske, 2011).
Also observe that lower investment costs (ci) will encourage investment not only
because of the higher benefit–cost ratio but also because it may increase tenure
security through a rise of private defence.16
16 These results are in contrast to Gonzalez (2006), where insecurity of private prop-
erty may discourage or prevent investment in more productive technology, notably even
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Figure 2
Investments in Land Productivity as a Function of Institutional Protection per Hectare
(case: z D .2rfj =Ordi i=ci /
1
< 1/; the dashed curve arises if rfj increases)


*
i
i
ci
r fjr
f
j
1 +
 i
ci
1 + z
z2 si
Ai
Do farmers react differently when a fall in tenure security is caused by more
outward aggression rather than weaker institutional protection? The dashed curve
in Figure 2 depicts the case of a higher benefit–cost ratio of fighting (rfj ). It is seen
that it reduces land investment just as before, but now any undertaken private de-
fence will fall as well. The latter occurs because the lower land productivity makes
it less worthwhile for the group to arrange more protection or even maintain its
level. Hence, in principle, more outward aggression has a stronger negative effect
on a group’s land productivity.17
5 Population Growth and the Feasibility of Institutional Protection
In this section we employ the extended model to investigate the effect of popula-
tion growth. We start by addressing the debate on the adaptability of traditional
land-holding systems to rising population pressure (see section 1) by studying the
effect of population growth on land investment and land tenure security. Sufficient
conditions are derived for population growth to exert a positive effect on land in-
vestment, qualifying also the importance of having institutional protection of land
rights in place. We argue, however, that population growth also tends to undermine
when costs are negligible. Our assumptions differ in at least two critical respects: first, the
insecurity arising from appropriation is not about the output resulting from investment,
but the resource itself – land – is contested; second, defending and fighting do not rival
with the scope for investment, allowing an increase of both.
17 The fall in d i

=Ai relates to the first branch of (15b) (see Proposition A3 in the
appendix). Here lower si =Ai has no effect on ˛i, whereas higher rfj reduces ˛i.
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institutional protection, whether customarily or legally arranged. This sets the stage
for a discussion of the ability of traditional systems and state-controlled systems
to project power over the land. The critical assumption we make is that this ability
depends on the amount of taxes or other contributions that can be extracted from
land users, which in turn depends on the arranged tenure security. We show that,
due to this interdependence, population growth may push the economy into a state
of low tenure security and land investment from which one cannot escape without
access to alternative resources.
5.1 Impact of Population Growth
The assumption of land scarcity under a Leontief production technology logically
implies that larger group sizes do not affect the equilibrium amounts of defensive
and offensive activities (d i

and f i

) and land investments (˛i

). In principle, larger
group sizes expand time constraints, and since these constraints are not binding,
population growth simply increases the abundance of resources used for work and
appropriation. Although population growth has no direct effect in the three-stage
game, there are two plausible channels through which it may have an indirect effect
on outcomes. Specifically, a growing population may increase the marginal valua-
tion of output (and land) and worsen the effectiveness of governance institutions.
A larger group size (Ni ) implies smaller land parcels per user and probably
also an increasing incidence of negative externalities among users (e.g., ecolog-
ical spillover effects). Thus land becomes scarcer and eventually will raise the
group’s marginal utility of output, particularly when the group starts to live close
to subsistence levels and a small drop in consumption can be fatal. Following this
lead, note that i (ıi , "i ) in (3) implicitly refers to the marginal substitution rate of
reducing work effort (defence, fighting) and more output. Making the marginal
utility of output explicit for the moment by calling it i , and using 
0
i (ı0i , "0i )
for the marginal utility of reducing work effort (defence, fighting), we can write
i WD  0i =i , ıi WD ı0i =i , and "i WD "0i =i . Hence, an increase of the marginal utility
of output translates into an equiproportionate decrease of i , ıi , and "i . The im-
pact on preferences may be even stronger, because a larger group also increases
unemployment. This may reduce the marginal valuation of leisure, and so further
decrease the disutilities of appropriative activities. In sum, under subsistence con-
ditions, the consequences of higher Ni can be reasonably inferred from a simulta-
neous increase in i (recall i WD 1i=ˇ, the marginal utility of output corrected
for the disutility of labour) and decrease in ıi and "i .
Let us consider the effects on a group’s land productivity and tenure security.
A larger group size raises the direct return to land investment (as i rises) and
the group’s benefit–cost ratio of defending (as Ordi rises). The latter induces addi-
tional defence and so higher tenure security at low levels of institutional protec-
tion (see the first branch of (15b)). Together the two factors increase the expected
benefit–cost ratio of investment per hectare, pi

i=ci . Thus land productivity im-
proves (see (14)), and also the situation in which institutional protection is not
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needed for full tenure security is promoted (as the case 2rfj = Ordi i=ci  1, be-
comes more likely). Therefore, we find that, at any institutional protection level,
land investment by group i increases when Ni rises. From a broader viewpoint,
this result is not far off from the Boserupian thesis that the threat of starvation and
the challenge of feeding more mouths motivates people to improve their farming
methods and invent new technologies in order to produce more food on their fields.
Yet what happens if the population of the other group also grows? A rise of Nj in-
creases group j ’s benefit–cost ratio of fighting (rfj ), which clearly threatens tenure
security. Land investment by group i falls if institutional protection fails to produce
full tenure security (i.e., if si=Ai < rfj ). More aggression generally lowers tenure
security not only directly (as in the basic model), but also because by discouraging
land investments it reduces any defensive activities that accompany these invest-
ments.
Hence, if both groups become larger, the impact on a group’s land productivity
and tenure security is unclear. It all depends on the population densities and growth
rates of the two groups and to what extent these demographics induce changes in
group preferences. Nevertheless, the preceding analysis implies that an unambigu-
ously positive effect on investments in land productivity arises in at least two cases,
as summarized by the following result:
Theorem 1 Under subsistence conditions,18 economy-wide population growth in-
creases investments in land productivity by group i if the other group’s increased
benefit–cost ratio of fighting for a hectare .rfj / does not exceed (i) half of its
increased benefit–cost ratio of defending a hectare with maximum productivity
. Ordi .1Ci=ci /=2/ or (ii) its existing institutional protection of a hectare .si=Ai /.
This result captures elements of the debate between those who see traditional
land-holding systems as flexible enough under population pressure to allow a
virtuous cycle of increasingly secure individual land rights, more productivity-
enhancing investments, and denser populations and those who question this op-
timistic view for sub-Saharan Africa by arguing that such a virtuous cycle requires
an appropriate development of supporting governance institutions (see section 1).
Case (i) of the theorem relates to the former view by playing down the role of insti-
tutional involvement. Weak institutional protection, whether legally or customar-
ily arranged, is simply supplemented with sufficient private protective activities to
prevent disagreements on who owns the land.19 Case (ii) relates to the latter, more
recently held view by emphasizing the necessity of having a third party in place
that independently defines and enforces property rights to land.
Another channel through which population growth may affect outcomes is the
efficacy of governance institutions. The working of both traditional systems and
18 That is, in situations where population growth increases the marginal utility of out-
put.
19 For example, in the absence of any group differences in preferences and costs (and
also ı D "), both groups would increase investments in land productivity if =c  1 and
so if the benefit–cost ratio of investment exceeds the productivity in the baseline.
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state-controlled systems of land tenure tends to be threatened by population growth.
In traditional systems, where land tenure is governed by customary law within a
community or network of communities, third-party enforcement is typically weak.
Land access is mainly regulated by the community members themselves through
consensus and negotiation, sometimes supported by local rulers or a council of el-
ders. Being based on voluntary information flows and voluntary participation in en-
forcement, these systems tend to lose their relative efficacy in governance as com-
munities grow, essentially due to an erosion of communitarian values and norms
that bind people together. This erosion is likely to result in coordination problems
within groups and even more between groups, with the effect of undermining tra-
ditional rules on land access and hindering new agreements (see, e.g., North, 1990;
Platteau, 2000, ch. 3; Dixit, 2004, ch. 3, for a formal treatment; Tabellini, 2008).
Also state-controlled systems come under pressure as populations grow, al-
though such formal systems are believed to have a greater potential for solving
problems in large-scale land access than traditional systems (see section 5.2). State-
controlled systems typically consist of legal machinery to enforce land contracts
and to resolve disputes with the help of police, courts, judges, and so on. Though
operating on a larger scale, a given capacity of legal enforcement also tends to offer
less protection to individual citizens as the population grows. In particular, land ad-
ministration programs with a static enforcement level may become less effective as
the number of people with land titles increases. Activities like demarcation of land
boundaries, registration and record keeping, adjudication of rights, and resolution
of conflicts tend to multiply under a growing population, putting pressure on the
existing legal framework (Deininger, 2003; Deininger and Feder, 2009).
Hence, we can safely conclude that, in the absence of formal or informal in-
vestments in governance capacity, population growth eventually leads to lower si
and sj . It is clear that in situations where institutional protection is necessary for
full tenure security, less protection per hectare (si=Ai ) may reduce a group’s land
investment and tenure security. One group may be more affected than the other, and
indeed different protection levels can create or foster group identities. An example
of this is the tendency for traditional systems to discriminate against categories
of land users with the least status and power when the communal land becomes
scarcer. Group inequalities can even arise for a more subtle reason. It is easy to
show that if group i is more vulnerable to opposition (so ıi > ıj ), an equal re-
duction of protection per hectare will particularly lower the tenure security of this
group (using (15b) with Ordi WD i=ıi ).
5.2 Feasibility of Institutional Protection
The crucial role of institutions in establishing a positive link between population
growth and land investment can be taken one step further by considering their fund-
ing. The ability of traditional systems and state-controlled systems to project power
over the land may be constrained by the difficulty in collecting taxes or other contri-
butions from land users. The two may even be interdependent in that the collected
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resources for funding governance structures are likely to increase with the degree
of tenure security that is accomplished. In Africa, much of the implementation of
formal land governance is often delegated to local governments. Insofar as they are
eligible to raise property taxes, land taxation could provide incentives to increase
land values by developing the local infrastructure to establish and maintain land
records. In this way, local land taxes could trigger a virtuous cycle of increasingly
precise land rights and higher land productivity. In practice, such a virtuous cycle
is often lacking due to a combination of poor infrastructure and low tax revenue
(Deininger, Hilhorst, and Songwe, 2014). Below we provide a tentative sketch of
how the budgetary room for improvements in the institutional protection of land
rights could be affected by population growth. For the sake of clarity, we ignore
any group differences in land, size, preferences, and costs, and moreover equate
appropriation costs (ı D ").20
Suppose each group pays taxes or contributions (T i ) that are proportional to the
amount of retained land:
(16) T i WD tpiAi with 0  t < ;
where t is the tax or contribution rate (it must be lower than  – the (corrected)
marginal utility of output – to make land investment worthwhile). With revenues
depending on tenure security, we mimic the general observation that without ef-
fective control of the territory it is difficult to collect taxes (Herbst, 2000; Di John,
2009; Deininger, Hilhorst, and Songwe, 2014). Raising revenue through land taxes
is common in a system where the state tries to control the land, but traditional
authorities in informal tenure systems also raise contributions from villagers to
support the communal judgement system. To some extent, the transfer of resources
may also reflect the privileges of senior headmen and chiefs gained through their
power and reputation (Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson, 2014; Beekman, 2015).
Then, in equilibrium, total tax revenues (T 1

CT 2

) depend positively on insti-
tutional protection per hectare, Ns WD s=.A=2/. Defining an auxiliary function m W
Œ0;Œ ! R given by
m.t/ WD 1 t=
2=c
and noting that m.t/ > 0 by (12) and (16), total tax revenues equal
20 The extended model with taxation is formulated in the appendix. Proposition A3
specifies the Nash equilibrium and the equilibrium tenure security function – the subse-
quent analysis uses both results.
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Figure 3
Land Tax Revenues under a Growing Population
(case m.t/ < 1; the dashed curve arises if the population grows)
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
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8ˆˆ
ˆˆˆˆ
ˆˆ<
ˆˆˆˆ
ˆˆˆˆ
:
1 if m.t/  1;8ˆˆ
ˆˆˆ<
ˆˆˆˆ
:ˆ
m.t/ if Ns  
"
m2.t/r
Ns "

if 
"
m2.t/  Ns  
"
1 if Ns  
"
9>>>>>=
>>>>>;
if m.t/ < 1
(17)
(using Proposition A3 in the appendix). The solid curve in Figure 3 shows the
tax revenue function T .It / for the case of m.t/ < 1, that is, when institutional
protection is necessary for achieving full tenure security.
Under subsistence conditions, population growth promotes the case m.t/ < 1
and eventually causes a shift of the tax revenue function for this case through the
rise of  and fall of " (see section 5.1). The effect is ambiguous. At low protection
levels, population growth increases tax revenues, mainly because the induced land
investments raise private defence and so tenure security. At high protection levels,
however, tax revenues diminish or stay the same, because the absence of private
defence allows an increase of fighting and, consequently, a fall in tenure security.
The dashed curve in Figure 3 shows the tax revenue function for an increased pop-
ulation.
At the same time, the funds needed to sustain tenure security increase for two
reasons. First, as argued in section 5.1, population growth tends to water down the
effectiveness of institutional protection at given governance capacity. Second, be-
cause population growth raises the benefit–cost ratio of fighting (="), protection
levels that initially achieved full tenure security may have to be scaled up to guar-
antee also full security for the increased population. Figure 3 illustrates both effects
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with initial protection Ns and threshold =" versus Ns0 (if investment in government
capacity stays out) and .="/0 for an increased population.
So far, then, the outcome is that maintaining full tenure security in a growing
population is problematic under subsistence conditions. Additional funds will be
required to improve governance capacity, but this poses a problem, as the revenues
from land taxation tend to fall. The obvious remedy appears to be an increase
in (formal) tax rates. However, a maximum limit exists on the revenue that can
be collected in a situation of low tenure security. Higher t raises tax revenue per
hectare, but lowers the number of taxable hectares, as it affects tenure security. In
response to higher taxes the groups reduce their self-defence, since this decreases
their benefit–cost ratio of defending (.˛

 t=/=ı), both directly and through its
negative impact on land investment. It can be shown that if institutional protection
is below a certain low level Ns

, rates higher than t D =2 cannot increase revenue,
implying a relatively low maximum tax revenue Am.=2/=2 (see Lemma A4 in
the appendix).
Hence, without access to external income sources, the economy may be trapped
in a state of low tenure security and land investment. This possible effect of popu-
lation growth is summarized by the following result:
Theorem 2 Under subsistence conditions, economy-wide population growth may
cause a state of low tenure security, low land investment, and low tax revenues from
the land. Raising tax rates to fund gradual improvements in institutional protection
can generate only a limited amount of revenue here. Specifically, suppose such a
bad state has protection Ns  Ns

, where21
Ns

WD 
"
m2

3
4


:
Then for all t 2 Œ0;Œ, it holds that
T .NsIt / D tAm.t/  
2
Am


2

:
The limitations of public policy in a steady state of underdevelopment have been
observed before. For instance, Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2003) find that im-
proving institutional protection to reduce extortion of productive firms by predatory
firms may require such a high tax rate that the profitability of productive firms – the
ones that have to pay the tax – becomes insufficient to outperform the profitability
of predatory firms, thus keeping the economy trapped in a low stage of develop-
ment (see also Dabla-Norris and Freeman, 2004). In a similar vein, Lloyd-Ellis and
Marceau (2003) show that, in the presence of endogenous credit constraints, which
particularly hurt low-wealth borrowers, reducing the expected payoff to predatory
21 If Ns  Ns (and m.t/ < 1), this state has p < 1 and ˛ D 1Cp=c < 1C=c. Note
that 0 < Ns  .="/m2.t/ if t 2 Œ0;3=4 and that .="/m2.t/  Ns < =" if t 2 Œ3=4;Œ
(see (17)). See Lemma A4 in the appendix; Theorem 2 readily follows from this lemma.
Dies ist urheberrechtlich geschütztes Material. Bereitgestellt von: Wageningen University, 19.05.2020
(2020) Securing Land Rights under Rapid Population Growth 337
behaviour through a public policy of heavier punishments may also backfire if the
required increase in taxes is too high. Having access to external sources to fund
public policy does not necessarily solve this problem. In our case, income trans-
fers from the central government may enable local governments to enhance the
necessary infrastructure, but it also increases their dependence on the politics of
the centre, thus weakening the link between taxation and public services and pos-
ing problems of legitimacy and accountability (Deininger, Hilhorst, and Songwe,
2014, pp. 81–82).
6 Conclusion
We constructed and analyzed a three-stage contest model to show how greater insti-
tutional protection of land rights could improve tenure security under land scarcity
conditions, and thus encourage land investment and save resources squandered on
land conflicts. The model was subsequently used to examine how increasing popu-
lation pressure on the land could affect this. Two key mechanisms were discussed:
higher population density could raise the marginal utility of output, and it could
weaken the protection provided by land institutions. The first mechanism implied
higher land values, which promoted land investment, but also lower costs of ap-
propriation, which promoted conflict and thus threatened land investment. This
allowed us to address the Boserupian nexus between population and land produc-
tivity by deriving sufficient conditions for population growth to exert a positive
effect on land investment, qualifying also the need for third-party protection of
land rights. The second mechanism posed the question of whether lower protection
of land rights because of population growth could be remedied by extracting funds
from land users in taxes or other contributions. We found that the two sides of the
budget were typically interdependent, as the collected funds from land users in-
creased with the degree of tenure security achieved through higher expenditure on
land-rights protection. This implied that population growth could push the econ-
omy into a low-productivity trap from which one could not escape by raising taxes
to finance increases in land-rights protection.
A basic prediction of our analysis links the growth in land productivity in sub-
Saharan countries or within-country regions to the performance of state or local
institutions and the growth of population. Countries with low productivity growth
would have weak fiscal and legal capacities and relatively high population densi-
ties, whereas countries with high productivity growth would show stronger state
capacities and face less population pressure. Escaping from the low “development
cluster” (Besley and Persson, 2011) is difficult. For countries or regions that were
able to jump to a higher stage of development through the build-up of stronger
institutions, access to external financial resources might have been a factor.
One weakness of our analysis is that we did not explicitly model the effects of
population growth. As a consequence, we could not systematically shut down other
channels through which population growth may affect preferences. For instance, in
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addition to the two mechanisms discussed, larger groups may also make within-
group cooperation more costly, which could raise the marginal costs of defending
and fighting. This would oppose the negative effect a higher marginal valuation
of output has on appropriation costs. Our model also excluded a long-run Malthu-
sian feedback effect, where land productivity affects population growth (see, e.g.,
Ashraf and Galor, 2011). A Malthusian steady-state condition would equate the
output per group member to some minimum subsistence level. Following this line
of reasoning, we would find that if institutional protection provides full tenure secu-
rity, a unique steady state exists with maximum productivity and high population.
At low levels of institutional protection with insecure land rights, group output will
be nonlinear in group size, and the economy may well end up in a locally stable
low-productivity, low-population equilibrium. For this case the point remains valid
that opportunities to improve institutional protection by raising taxes are essentially
limited.
Appendix
A.1 Proposition A1
The two-stage game has a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium ..d 1

;f 1

/;
.d 2

;f 2

// given by
d i

D max

0;min

.rdi =2/
2
r
f
j
Ai si ; Odi

;
f i

0 D
8<
:
q
d
j

Csj
q Odj Csj 
q
d
j

Csj

if dj

 Odj ;
0 if dj

 Odj :
Proof It will be useful to define
(A1) Qdi WD .r
d
i =2/
2
r
f
j
Ai si :
Noting (10), Qdi is a potential level of defensive effort.
Step 1. Consider the game in strategic form that we obtain by fixing d1 2 Œ0;N1
and d2 2 Œ0;N2. For the payoff functions Qv1 and Qv2 of this game we have
Qvi .f i If j / D ˛iiAi d
i Csi
d i Csi Cf j CiAj
f i
d j Csj Cf i ıid
i "if i :
First we prove that for every strategy dj player i has a strictly dominant strategy
(A2) f i .d j / WD
´
yi .d j / if yi .d j / > 0;
0 if yi .d j /  0:
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Note that (A2) is equivalent to (9) with i and j interchanged. Also, the conditional
payoff functions of player i are the functions Qvi .If j /. If Aj D 0, then f i D 0 is the
unique maximizer. In this case yi .d j / D dj  sj < 0, so the desired result holds
for Aj D 0. Now suppose Aj > 0. As iAj and dj Csj are positive, all conditional
payoff functions of player i are strictly concave. As these functions also are con-
tinuous, they have a unique maximizer. As this maximizer does not depend on f j ,
player i has a strictly dominant strategy. So this strategy is the unique maximizer
of Qvi .I0/ and therefore of
iAj
f i
d j Csj Cf i "if
i :
The derivative w.r.t. f i of this function is
iAj
d j Csj
.d j Csj Cf i /2 "i I
it is zero if and only if f i D yi .d j /. Using the strict concavity and decreasingness
of this function and recalling Odi < Ni and yi < Ni  Odi (see (8)), we see that the
desired result also holds for the case Aj > 0.
Step 2. Consider the game in strategic form that we obtain by inserting in v1
and v2 for .f 1;f 2/ the Nash equilibrium .f 1.d 2/;f 2.d 1// of the second stage given
by (A2). For the payoff functions v1 and v2 of this game we have
vi .d i Idj / D ˛iiAi d
i Csi
d i Csi Cf j .d i /
CiAj
f
i
.d j /
d j Csj Cf i .d j /
ıid i "if i .d j /:
We now prove that in this game each player i has a strictly dominant strategy d i

given by
(A3) d i

D
8ˆ<
:ˆ
0 if Qdi  0 or Odi  0;
Qdi if 0  Qdi  Odi ;
Odi if 0  Odi  Qdi
(note that this implies (10)). We distinguish between two cases. First suppose
Odi  0: now f j D 0 and d i Csi Cf j .d i / D d i Csi . So
vi .d i Idj / D ˛iiAi CiAj
f
i
.d j /
d j Csj Cf i .d j /
ıid i "if i .d j /:
We see that d i

D 0 is a strictly dominant strategy of player i .
Next suppose Odi  0: now f j .d i / D 0 (d i  Odi ) and f j .d i / D yj .d i / (d i  Odi ).
For d i  Odi it follows that d i C si Cf j .d i / D
q
.Ai=r
f
j /
p
d i Csi . With this we
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obtain
vi .d i Idj / D
8ˆˆ
ˆˆˆ<
ˆˆˆˆ
:ˆ
˛ii
s
Ai
r
f
j
p
d i Csi CiAj
f
i
.d j /
d j Csj Cf i .d j /
ıid i "if i .d j /
if d i  Odi ;
˛iiAi CiAj
f
i
.d j /
d j Csj Cf i .d j /
ıid i "if i .d j / if d i  Odi :
We see that the desired results hold if Ai D 0. Now suppose Ai > 0. Consider the
function vi .Idj /. On the first branch it is strictly concave, and on the second it
is affine and strictly decreasing. As the function is continuous, it is strictly quasi-
concave and therefore has a unique maximizer. As the maximizer does not depend
on dj , player i has a strictly dominant strategy d i

. Noting that the unique maxi-
mizer of the function R
C
! R defined by x 7! ˛ii
q
Ai=r
f
j
p
xCsi  ıix equals
Qdi D Œ.rdi =2/2=rfj Ai si if Qdi  0 and equals 0 otherwise, the desired results follow.
Step 3. Now we can finish the proof of Proposition A1: apply (A2) and (A3).
Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Again define the potential level of defence Qdi by (A1).
Step 1. Odi  0 ) d i D 0 and f j D 0. And 2rfj  rdi ) f j D 0. Proof of first
statement: by Proposition A1, 0  d i

D max.0;min. Qdi ; Odi //  max.0; Odi / D 0 and
so d i

D 0. This implies f j

D 0. Proof of second statement: now Qdi  Odi . Proposi-
tion A1 implies d i

D max.0; Odi/  Odi and so f j D 0.
Step 2. Now we can finish the proof of Proposition 1. If Ai D 0, then Odi  0 and,
by step 1, f j

D 0. If Ai > 0 and 2rfj  rdi , then, by step 1, f j D 0. If Ai > 0 and
2r
f
j > r
d
i and si=Ai  rfj , then Odi  0 and so, by step 1, f j D 0.
Now suppose f j

D 0. We have to prove that one of the above-mentioned three
possibilities holds. We may assume Ai > 0. Now we have to prove that 2rfj  rdi ,
or si=Ai  rfj and 2rfj > rdi . This we do by contradiction. So suppose 2rfj > rdi ,
and si=Ai < rfj or 2rfj  rdi , i.e., suppose 2rfj > rdi and si=Ai < rfj . This implies
Odi > 0. So d i D max.0; Qdi /  Œ.rdi =2/2=rfj Ai  si < Odi , which in turn implies the
contradiction
f j

Dpd i

Csi
q
Odi Csi 
p
d i

Csi

> 0:
Q.E.D.
Dies ist urheberrechtlich geschütztes Material. Bereitgestellt von: Wageningen University, 19.05.2020
(2020) Securing Land Rights under Rapid Population Growth 341
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Again define the potential level of defence Qdi by (A1) (see (A3)). In terms of Qdi
and Odi this proposition reads
if Qdi  Odi ; then pi D 1;(A4)
if Qdi < Odi ; then pi D
8ˆˆ
ˆˆˆ<
ˆˆˆˆ
:ˆ
rdi
2r
f
j
if 0 < Qdi ;r
si
Ai
=r
f
j if Qdi  0 < Odi ;
1 if Odi  0:
(A5)
The desired result follows from Proposition A1 and the definition of pi in (1) by
noting that
(a) if Qdi  Odi (or 2rfj  rdi /, then d i D max.0; Odi / and f j D 0;
(b) if Qdi < Odi (or 2rfj > rdi ), then
(i) if 0  Qdi (or si=Ai  Œ.rdi =2/2=rfj ), then
d i

D Qdi and f j D yj . Qdi / D
s
.rdi =2/
2
r
f
j
Ai
 q
r
f
j Ai 
s
.rdi =2/
2
r
f
j
Ai
!
I
(ii) if Qdi  0  Odi (or .rdi =2/2=rfj  si=Ai  rfj ), then
d i

D 0 and f j

D yj .0/ D psi
q
r
f
j Ai 
p
si

I
(iii) if Odi  0 (or si=Ai  rfj ), then d i D 0 and f j D 0.
Q.E.D.
A.4 Proposition A2
Suppose s1=A1 D s2=A2 DW s. Resource costs in (11) are a decreasing function of s,
i.e., .ı.d 1

Cd2

/C".f 1

Cf 2

//=A is decreasing in s.
Proof Step 1. Note that ı D ", rdi =2 D rdj DW rd and rfi D rfj DW rf . Let
Qr WD .rd=2/2=rf I
Qr has no direct interpretation, but note that Qr  s is a potential defence level per
hectare (see (10)). We have
d1

A1
D d
2

A2
D max.0;min. Qr s;rf s//;(A6)
f i

Ai
D 1p
p

Aj
Ai

d1

A1
C Ns

:(A7)
Proof of (A6): with Proposition A1. Proof of (A7): use p

D .d j

Csj /=.d jCsj Cf i/
and (A6).
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Step 2. (A6) implies, with A D A1 CA2, that
d1

Cd2

A
D A1
A
d1

A1
C A2
A
d2

A2
D d
1

A1
:
And with (A7) we obtain
f 1

Cf 2

A
D A1
A
f 1

A1
C A2
A
f 2

A2
D 1p
p


d1

A1
C Ns

:
Therefore
d1

Cd2

Cf 1

Cf 2

A
D

1p

p

C1

d1

A1
C 1p
p

Ns D 1
p

d1

A1
C

1
p

1

Ns:
Now with (A6) we obtain
(A8) d
1

Cd2

Cf 1

Cf 2

A
D 1
p

max.0;min. Qr s;rf s//C

1
p

1

Ns:
Thus resource costs are a function of s.
Step 3. First note that 2rf  rd , rf  Qr . Now (A8) together with Proposition 2
implies:
(a) if Qr  rf , then
.d 1

Cd2

/C .f 1

Cf 2

/
A
D
´
rf  Ns if Ns < rf ;
0 if Ns  rf I
(b) if Qr < rf , then
.d 1

Cd2

/C .f 1

Cf 2

/
A
D
8ˆ<
:ˆ
Ns CpQrprf if Ns < Qr;pNsprf pNs if Qr  Ns < rf ;
0 if Ns  rf :
Inspecting the above two formulas shows the decreasingness in s. (The decreas-
ingness of the function on the second branch is guaranteed if its derivative is  0.
This holds if rf =4  Qr , which is implied by ˛  1.) Q.E.D.
A.5 The Three-Stage Game of the Extended Model
In this game (see sections 4 and 5), ˛1;˛2 2  WD Œ1;1Œ are chosen in the first stage;
d1, d2 in the second stage; and f 1, f 2 in the third stage. The payoffs may include
the subtraction of (taxes) tpiAi where 0  t < i (see (16)). The payoff of player i
is given by
vi ..˛i ;d i ;f i /I.˛j ;d j ;f j //
WD i

˛i  t
i

Ai
d i Csi
d i Csi Cf j CAj
f i
d j Csj Cf i

ıid i "if i Ci.˛i /;
(A9)
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where Ci.˛i / is given by (12). Recall i=ci < 2rfj = Ordi , where Ordi D i=ıi . Observe
that the extended model of section 4 is obtained by setting t D 0.
A.6 Proposition A3
Suppose Ai > 0. Define Qd i .˛/ WD Œ. Ordi ˛=2/2=rfj Ai  si ; then Qd i .˛/ is a potential
level of defence for given ˛ (see (10)). The three-stage game has a unique subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium ..˛1

;d 1

;f 1

/;.˛2

;d 2

;f 2

// given by
˛i

D 1Cpi

i
ci
;(A10)
d i

D max

0;min

Qd i

˛i

 t
i

; Odi

;
f i

D
8<
:
q
d
j
 Csj
q Odj Csj 
q
d
j
 Csj

> 0 if dj  Odj ;
0 if dj

 Odj ;
where
(a) if 2rfj = Ordi i=ci  1 t=i, then
pi

D
8ˆˆ
ˆˆˆˆ
<ˆ
ˆˆˆˆ
ˆˆˆ:
1 t=i
2r
f
j = Ordi i=ci
if si
Ai
 rfj

2r
f
j
Ordi
 i
ci

2
1 t
i
2
;
r
si
Ai
=r
f
j if rfj

2r
f
j
Ordi
 i
ci

2
1 t
i
2
 si
Ai
 rfj ;
1 if si
Ai
 rfj I
(b) if 2rfj = Ordi i=ci  1 t=i, then pi D 1.
Proof Observe that the payoff (A9) without the cost Ci is the same as (4) with ˛i
replaced by ˛i  t=i . This implies that the result of Proposition A1 and its proof
concerning the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of stages 2 and 3 remain valid if
we replace rdi by Ordi .˛i t=i/. Also, Propositions 1 and 2 and their proofs continue
to hold for the three-stage game if we make this replacement.
Now note the following: Odi and yi in (6) and (7) depend neither on ˛i nor on ˛j .
Further, d i

;f
j
 , and pi may depend on ˛i but not on ˛j . Then we see that the
formulas for d i

and f i

hold. It remains to prove the formulas for pi

and ˛i

.
Define, besides f i given by (A2), also d i W  ! Œ0;Ni  by
(A11) d i .˛i / WD max

0;min

. Ordi .˛i  t=i/=2/2
r
f
j
	
Ai si ; Odi

and in accordance with (1),
(A12) pi

˛i I si
Ai

WD d
i
.˛i /Csi
d
i
.˛i /Csi Cf j .d i .˛i //
:
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Consider the game in strategic form obtained by substituting in the formulas for v1
and v2, given by (A9), first for .f 1;f 2/ the strictly dominant Nash equilibrium
.f
1
.d 2/;f
2
.d 1// of stage 3, and next for .d 1;d 2/ the strictly dominant Nash equi-
librium .d 1.˛1/;d2.˛2// of stage 2. Denoting the resulting functions by Ov1 and Ov2,
we have
Ovi .˛i I˛j / D i

˛i  t
i

pi

˛i I si
Ai

Ai C

1pj

˛j I sj
Aj

Aj

ıid i .˛i /"if i .d j .˛j //Ci.˛i /:
This implies that the best-reply correspondence of each player is constant and that
for player i this constant equals the set of maximizers of the function wi W  ! R
given by
(A13) wi.˛i / WD i

˛i  t
i

pi

˛i I si
Ai

Ai ıid i .˛i / ciAi
2
.˛i 1/2
(see (13)). Now we are ready to prove the formulas for pi

and ˛i

. We do this in
three steps.
Step 1.
(a) If si=Ai  rfj , then pi.˛i Isi=Ai/ D 1 and d i .˛i / D 0.
(b) If si=Ai < rfj , then
pi

˛i I si
Ai

D
r
si
Ai
=r
f
j and d i .˛i / D 0 if ˛i 
t
i
 2r
f
j
Ordi
r
si
Ai
=r
f
j ;
pi

˛i I si
Ai

D Or
d
i
2r
f
j
.˛i  t=i/ and d i .˛i / D . Or
d
i .˛
i  t=i//2=2
r
f
j
Ai si
if
2r
f
j
Ordi
r
si
Ai
=r
f
j < ˛
i  t
i
<
2r
f
j
Ordi
;
pi

˛i I si
Ai

D 1 and d i .˛i / D r
f
j
Ai
si if ˛i  t
i
 2r
f
j
Ordi
:
(c) If si=Ai  rfj , then wi.˛i / D gi0.˛i /Ci.˛i /, where gi0.x/ WD iAi .x t=i/.
(d) If si=Ai < rfj , then
wi.˛i / D
8ˆˆ
ˆˆˆˆ
<ˆ
ˆˆˆˆ
ˆˆˆ:
gi1.˛
i /Ci.˛i / if ˛i  t
i
 2r
f
j
Ordi
r
si
Ai
=r
f
j ;
gi2.˛
i /Ci.˛i / if
2r
f
j
Ordi
r
si
Ai
=r
f
j < ˛
i  t
i
<
2r
f
j
Ordi
;
gi3.˛
i /Ci.˛i / if ˛i  t
i
 2r
f
j
Ordi
;
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where
gi1.x/ WD iAi
r
si
Ai
=r
f
j

x t
i

; gi2.x/ WD Ai
. Ordi =2/2
r
f
j
ıi

x t
i
2
Cıisi ;
gi3.x/ WD iAi

x t
i

ıi

j
"j
Ai si

:
Proof The statements for pi.˛i Isi=Ai/ follow from (A4) and (A5) with Qdi as
in (A1), i.e., here
Qdi D . Or
d
i .˛
i  t=i//2=2
r
f
j
Ai si :
Indeed, just note that in (a) Odi  0 and in (b) Odi > 0, and that the three branches
relate to the cases Qdi  0, 0 < Qdi < Odi , Qdi  Odi . Having this and the expressions
for pi.˛i Isi=Ai /, the statements for wi.˛i / follow with (A11) and (A13). Concern-
ing the results in (d), we note that the following holds. Case Qdi  0: d i .˛i / D 0.
Case 0 < Qdi < Odi : d i D Qdi . Case Qdi > Odi : d i D Odi .
Step 2. With gi0;gi1;gi2;gi3 W RC ! R as in step 1, the functions gi0 Ci , gi1 Ci ,
gi2 Ci , and gi3 Ci are continuously differentiable and strictly concave. They all
have a unique stationary point and therefore a unique maximizer: O˛0, O˛1, O˛2, O˛3,
respectively, where
O˛0 D O˛3 WD 1C i
ci
; O˛1 WD 1C i
ci
r
si
Ai
=r
f
j ; O˛2 WD 1C
i
ci

1 t=i
2r
f
j = Ordi i=ci

:
Also the wi in (c) and (d) in step 1 are continuously differentiable and strictly con-
cave.
Proof It is straightforward to check the statements about gi0 Ci , gi1 Ci , gi2 Ci ,
gi3 Ci . As for wi , the case in (c) is evident. Regarding (d), it is straightforward
to check that wi is continuously differentiable. The derivative of wi is strictly de-
creasing on the first branch, the second branch, and the third branch (remembering
that i=ci < 2rfj = Ordi ). It follows that wi is strictly concave.
Step 3. Now we are ready to finish the proof. Step 2 implies that each stationary
point of wi is a unique maximizer and so equals ˛i

. Below we determine ˛i

. Hav-
ing ˛i

, it is straightforward with step 1 to verify that the formula (A10) holds. We
distinguish between four cases.
By step 2, O˛0 is the unique maximizer of gi0 Ci . Step 1 implies that O˛0 also is
the unique maximizer of wi if si=Ai  rfj . Thus in this case ˛i D O˛0.
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By step 2, O˛1 is the unique maximizer of gi1 Ci . Steps 1 and 2 imply that O˛1 also
is the unique maximizer of wi if
si
Ai
< r
f
j and O˛1 
t
i
 2r
f
j
Ordi
r
si
Ai
ı
r
f
j :
A calculation shows that these two inequalities are equivalent with
r
f
j

2r
f
j
Ordi
 i
ci

2
1 t
i
2
 si
Ai
< r
f
j :
Thus in this case ˛i

D O˛1.
By step 2, O˛2 is the unique maximizer of gi2 Ci . Steps 1 and 2 imply that O˛2 also
is the unique maximizer of wi if
si
Ai
< r
f
j and
2r
f
j
Ordi
r
si
Ai
ı
r
f
j < O˛2 
t
i
<
2r
f
j
Ordi
:
A calculation shows that these two inequalities are equivalent with si=Ai < rfj and
2r
f
j = Ordi i=ci  1 t=i . Thus in this case ˛i D O˛2.
By step 2, O˛3 is the unique maximizer of gi3 Ci . Steps 1 and 2 imply that O˛3 also
is the unique maximizer of wi if si=Ai < rfj and O˛3  t=i  2rfj = Ordi . A calculation
shows that these two inequalities are equivalent with si=Ai < rfj and 2rfj = Ordi 
i=ci  1 t=i . Thus in this case ˛i D O˛3. Q.E.D.
A.7 Lemma A4
Suppose m < 1. Define
Ns

WD 
"
m2

3
4


:
Let Ns 2 0; Ns

 and t 2 Œ0;Œ. (a) T .NsIt /  A.=2/m.=2/; (b) p

< 1.
Proof It is immediate that =2 is the unique maximizer of the function Œ0;Œ ! R
given by t 7! tm.t/. We further distinguish between two cases.
Case t 2 Œ0;3=4: As m is decreasing, we have

"
m2.t/  
"
m2

3
4


D s

:
As s  s

, it follows that p

D m.t/ < 1 and thus
T .sIt / D Atm.t/  A
2
m


2

:
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Case t 2 Œ3=4;Œ: As m is decreasing, we have

"
m2.t/  
"
m2

3
4


D s

<

"
:
This implies for s 2 0;.="/m2.t / that p

D m.t/  m.3=4/ < 1 and thus
T .sIt / D Atm.t/  A
2
m


2

;
and for s 2 .="/m2.t /;s

 that
p

D
r
Ns "


r
s

"

 m

3
4


< 1
and thus
T .sIt / D At
r
s
"

 A
r
s
"

 A
r
s

"

D A
2
m


2

:
Q.E.D.
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